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Patenting the Curve Ball: Business Methods and 
Industry Norms 
Gerard N. Magliocca 
Inevitably, any policy to restrict abstract patents amounts to drawing 
a line between what is patentable and what is not, and, 
unfortunately, such lines are drawn in the shifting sands of words. . . .  
 We thus do not know what it will take to appropriately restrict 
abstract patents in general or software patents in particular. 
James Bessen & Michael J. Meurer1 
 
Candy Cummings is not a household name, but he is credited 
with inventing a vital part of American civilization—the curve ball.2 
The ongoing controversy over whether, and to what extent, business 
methods should be patentable raises a fascinating question: Could a 
modern-day counterpart of Cummings who comes up with the next 
breakthrough pitch patent that invention?3 Under the test set forth 
 
   Professor of Law, Indiana University – Indianapolis. Many thanks to Carlo 
Andreani, Dan Cole, Kevin Collins, Michael Risch, and the attendees at the conference on 
“Patents and Fostering Entrepreneurship” at George Washington University Law School for 
their comments. Special thanks to my colleagues at the Roosevelt Study Center in Middelburg, 
The Netherlands, who hosted me while I worked on this paper during my sabbatical. 
 1. JAMES BESSEN & MICHAEL J. MEURER, PATENT FAILURE: HOW JUDGES, 
BUREAUCRATS, AND LAWYERS PUT INNOVATORS AT RISK 244 (2008). 
 2. See MARTIN QUIGLEY, THE CROOKED PITCH (1984). As with many great leaps in 
technology, there is a dispute over who really invented the curve ball. Cf. United States v. Am. 
Bell Tel. Co., 128 U.S. 315, 354 (1888) (addressing a claim that Alexander Graham Bell was 
not the first inventor of the phone). Some give the nod to Fred Goldsmith, a contemporary of 
Cummings who pitched for the oddly named London Tecumsehs. See QUIGLEY, supra at 22. 
Nevertheless, the Veterans’ Committee of the Baseball Hall of Fame inducted Cummings into 
Cooperstown based on its conclusion that he was the rightful claimant. See id. at 33. On this 
sort of matter, the Veterans’ Committee is the final authority.   
 3. See State St. Bank & Trust Co. v. Signature Fin. Group, Inc., 149 F.3d 1368, 1373–
77 (Fed. Cir. 1998) (holding that there is no “business method” exception for patents). The 
patentability of the curve ball is not an original hypothetical. See, e.g., Rochelle Cooper 
Dreyfuss, Are Business Method Patents Bad for Business?, 16 SANTA CLARA COMPUTER & HIGH 
TECH. L.J. 263, 276 (2000) (“What, for example, if Candy Cummings had patented the curve 
ball or Dick Fosbury, his high jump ‘flop?’”); Keith E. Maskus & Eina Vivian Wong, Searching 
for Economic Balance in Business Method Patents, 8 WASH. U. J.L. & POL’Y 289, 292–93 
(2002) (“Suppose that a pitching coach on a minor-league baseball team developed an 
effective new pitch, the ‘split-fingered curveball.’ Perhaps the pitch itself would not be eligible 
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by the Federal Circuit in In re Bilski,4 any process that “is tied to a 
particular machine or apparatus” or that “transforms a particular 
article into a different state or thing,” is patentable so long as it is 
novel and nonobvious.5 When it was first thrown, the curve ball was 
novel, was nonobvious in the sense that it revolutionized baseball (so 
much so that Cummings was inducted into the Hall of Fame for his 
idea), and could be considered a process that was tied to a particular 
apparatus (the ball) or that transforms the ball into a different state.6 
Accordingly, if a pitch as groundbreaking as the curve ball were 
developed today, then its inventor probably (or at least plausibly) 
could obtain a patent.7 
The problem with this conclusion is that most people would 
think it absurd to allow a player to patent a pitch, and it is unlikely 
that baseball leagues would let this happen.8 Gamesmanship is a part 
of sports, but there is a deeply rooted ethic among athletes (save for 
some cheaters) that competition should occur on a level playing field 
based on individual ability.9 Moreover, allowing one team or player 
 
for a patent, but the coach should be able to protect his instructional technique.” (internal 
citation omitted)). Indeed, the issue was raised at oral argument in In re Bilski. See Christopher 
A. Harkins, Throwing Judge Bryson’s Curveball: A Pro Patent View of Process Claims as Patent-
Eligible Subject Matter, 7 J. MARSHALL REV. INTELL. PROP. L. 701, 723–24 (2008) 
(discussing these comments).  
 4. 545 F.3d 943, 954 (Fed. Cir. 2008) (en banc), cert. granted sub nom. Bilski v. Doll, 
192 S. Ct. 2735 (2009). 
 5. Id. at 954; see 35 U.S.C. §§ 102–103 (2006) (laying out the novelty and 
nonobviousness requirements). There are some additional elements that must be met for 
patentability, most notably the enablement rule of 35 U.S.C. § 112, but it is fair to say that 
nonobviousness and novelty are the most important statutory factors. 
 6. See supra note 2. In other words, gripping and throwing a rock or a bowling ball like 
a curve ball does not produce the same effect, and thus the “curve ball process” is limited to a 
particular device. As for whether this transforms the ball into a different state, ask anybody who 
tries to hit a breaking pitch.  
 7. See Harkins, supra note 3, at 734 (concluding that a curve ball could be patentable 
subject matter under 35 U.S.C. § 101). During the oral argument in Bilski, Judge Bryson 
stated that “[a] curveball is a baseball which has been, you could say, transformed into a 
baseball that has a great deal of spin on it and is being thrown at a pace which it didn’t have at 
the time it was in the pitcher’s hand.” Id. at 724. 
 8. A sports league could address this problem by barring players from enforcing patents 
or by imposing a compulsory license for a nominal fee. See Carl A. Kukkonen, III, Be A Good 
Sport and Refrain from Using My Patented Putt: Intellectual Property Protection for Sports 
Related Movements, 80 J. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. SOC’Y 808, 828 (1998). If, however, the 
inventor was not a member of the league, then the only options would be to ban the pitch 
entirely or pay the fee demanded for its use as long as the license was open to all players.  
 9. See Dreyfuss, supra note 3, at 276 (“[S]porting events are interesting because they 
pit humans against one another to determine whose abilities are superior. For that competition 
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to hold a monopoly on a key aspect of the sport would allow the 
patentee to dominate in a way that would hurt fan interest.10 Put 
another way, there is a norm in the sports community that 
disseminating and using knowledge is more important than 
creativity. Consequently, patent law is not helpful or necessary for 
that business.11 
This Article argues that there should be a presumption against 
considering a process patentable subject matter under 35 U.S.C. § 
101 when a norm can be found in the relevant industry against 
patenting the class of innovations at issue.12 The curve ball example 
encapsulates my view that the Patent Office and the courts would do 
better by being norm-followers rather than norm-entrepreneurs with 
respect to process patents.13 With the Supreme Court’s grant of 
certiorari in Bilski to clarify § 101, the time is ripe for a 
reconsideration of the entire subject.14 
 
to be true, participants need to compete—literally—on a level playing field. Allowing one 
athlete to use a move that is denied to others would destroy the essence of the event.”). This 
varies depending on what sport is involved. Golf is on one end of the spectrum (cheating there 
is almost unheard of), whereas soccer is on the other end (consider all of the players who flop 
and try to get the referee to award a penalty kick). Baseball is closer to soccer in this respect, 
with spitballs, stealing signs, and steroids as the leading examples, but this does not mean that 
the norms of baseball would tolerate the open advantages for a particular player or team that a 
patent would grant. 
 10. See Kukkonen, supra note 8, at 828 (“If Dick Fosbury had been granted a patent on 
his revolutionary style of high jumping, he could have dominated the sport for years.”). Fans 
are not especially interested in seeing games that are fixed by gamblers, and it is doubtful that 
they would be any more enthusiastic about a contest where patent law gives one side a huge 
edge. 
 11. See John R. Thomas, The Patenting of the Liberal Professions, 40 B.C. L. REV. 1139, 
1176 (1999) (“[T]raditionally patent-free professions may resist the prospect of extensive 
appropriation of their techniques.”).  
 12. See 35 U.S.C. § 101 (2006) (providing the definition of patentable subject matter). 
There is considerable evidence that courts take industry practices into account in tailoring the 
requirements of patent law, see Dan L. Burk & Mark A. Lemley, Policy Levers in Patent Law, 
89 VA. L. REV. 1575, 1577–79 (2003), but this Article takes that thought one step further by 
arguing that patentability itself ought to be conditioned on business norms.  
 13. This Article builds on recent scholarship about how norms interact with intellectual 
property. See, e.g., Thomas F. Cotter, A Burkean Perspective on Patent Eligibility, 22 BERKELEY 
TECH. L.J. 855, 858 (2007) (“[A] Burkean-inspired approach to patent law—one that 
respects, though it does not worship, tradition and that generally prefers gradual to radical 
change—suggests that we consider again some traditional, but now dormant, restraints on 
patentable subject matter that may have embodied a degree of wisdom.”); Jennifer E. 
Rothman, The Questionable Use of Custom in Intellectual Property, 93 VA. L. REV. 1899, 1967–
80 (2007) (evaluating when custom should and should not be used for IP). 
 14. See In re Bilski, 545 F.3d 943, 956 (Fed. Cir. 2008) (en banc) (“[W]e agree that 
future developments in technology and the sciences may present difficult challenges to the 
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There are three benefits that come from replacing the current 
standard for process patentability, which ignores industry customs 
unless there is a statutory command to the contrary, with a test that 
utilizes those norms.15 First, fewer business method patents would be 
issued under this modified standard, and this would be a positive 
reform because of the poor notice and costly litigation now 
associated with these patents.16 Second, using norms to define the 
scope of patentability can help solve the vexing problem that any 
attempt to craft a formal definition of a business method or process 
leads to confusion.17 Third, the current view of process patents 
empowers those who seek to defect from a community ethic (e.g., 
the cheating athlete) and imposes an unjustified burden on many 
industries. 
Rather than reject or accept business method patents outright, 
therefore, this analysis steers a middle course that says they should be 
patentable subject matter as long as the relevant community believes 
that is not inappropriate. Naturally, this is bound to upset scholars 
who argue for a business method patent exclusion or those who 
believe that no restriction on these patents can be applied in a 
principled way.18 Likewise, those who seek a clear answer to the 
 
machine-or-transformation test, just as the widespread use of computers and the advent of the 
Internet has begun to challenge it in the past decade. Thus, we recognize that the Supreme 
Court may ultimately decide to alter or perhaps even set aside this test to accommodate 
emerging technologies.”), cert. granted sub nom. Bilski v. Doll, 192 S. Ct. 2735 (2009). 
 15. On the efforts of tax lawyers to get an exemption passed barring tax shelter patents, 
see Dan L. Burk & Brett H. McDonnell, Patents, Tax Shelters, and the Firm, 26 VA. TAX REV. 
981, 1002 (2007) (“[S]ince the interpretation of the patent statute by courts and by the Patent 
Office has led to the ‘let it all in’ approach to subject matter, there have been calls for Congress 
to intervene, at least with regard to tax shelter patents.”). The Patent Reform Act of 2007, 
which was passed by the House of Representatives but died in the Senate, did contain a tax 
shelter exemption. See H.R. Res. 1908, 110th Cong. § 10 (2007). 
 16. See BESSEN & MEURER, supra note 1, at 150–55 (presenting empirical evidence that 
business method patents have much higher litigation rates than other patents); see id. at 187 
(stating that these patents “often have unclear boundaries and give rise to opportunistic 
litigation”). 
 17. See, e.g., John R. Allison & Starling D. Hunter, On the Feasibility of Improving 
Patent Quality One Technology at a Time: The Case of Business Methods, 21 BERKELEY TECH. 
L.J. 729, 765 (2006) (“All attempts by courts and Congress to arrive at a workable definition 
for business method patents have encountered intractable difficulties.”). 
 18. Compare Jay Dratler, Jr., Does Lord Darcy Yet Live? The Case Against Software and 
Business-Method Patents, 43 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 823, 833–36 (2003) (arguing that business 
method patents are contrary to the policies underlying Anglo-American patent law) and 
Michael J. Meurer, Business Method Patents and Patent Floods, 8 WASH. U. J.L. & POL’Y 309, 
310 (2002) (calling for the reversal of State Street Bank and the return of the business method 
DO NOT DELETE 11/3/2009  10:01 AM 
875 Patenting the Curveball 
 879 
question of whether software should be patentable may be 
disappointed, since that turns on a factual inquiry into the views of 
communities that are often divided on the issue.19 Adopting a norm-
sensitive approach towards business methods, though, would at least 
restrict patent’s domain to those areas where it can do some good. 
Part I of this Article explores the background law about business 
method patents and criticizes the Federal Circuit’s view that groups 
who are not receptive to patents must seek relief from Congress. Part 
II lays out an alternative model that borrows from the obviousness 
analysis under 35 U.S.C. § 103 and examines (either as the actual 
test or as a secondary factor) whether an “ordinary person skilled in 
the art” would view the claim as falling within a class of patentable 
subject matter before granting a process patent.  
I. PATENTS WHETHER YOU LIKE THEM OR NOT 
This Part examines the statutory text and case law related to 
business method patents in light of the compelling arguments made 
by advocates for and against these patents.20 Unfortunately, a careful 
review of the relevant sources yields almost no helpful guidance. As a 
 
exception), and Leo J. Raskind, The State Street Bank Decision: The Bad Business of Unlimited 
Patent Protection for Methods of Doing Business, 10 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. 
L.J. 61, 101 (1999) (“The broad sweep of the State Street Bank opinion remains a cause for 
concern.”), with John R. Allison & Emerson H. Tiller, The Business Method Patent Myth, 18 
BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 987, 1021 (2003) (“[T]reating different technologies differently places 
too great a premium on ex ante definitions, such that the definitional scheme will be at least 
partially defeated because of the significant transaction costs associated with attorney efforts to 
opt into or out of a definition by carefully tailoring invention descriptions and patent claims.”), 
and Burk & McDonnell, supra note 15, at 1001–02 (arguing that any limit on business 
method patents would be futile because it could be evaded through clever claim drafting). 
 19. See BESSEN & MEURER, supra note 1, at 244 (“The empirical evidence makes us 
quite sure that some change is needed [for software patents]; however, we are uncertain what 
change is best.”); Gerard N. Magliocca, Blackberries and Barnyards: Patent Trolls and the Perils 
of Innovation, 82 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1809, 1811–13 (2007) (comparing modern patent 
trolls to nineteenth-century patent sharks and suggesting the abolition of software and business 
method patents). 
 20. My analysis focuses on business methods because these are the process patents that 
receive the most scrutiny. The discussion in the text, however, does not define a business 
method, other than to say that it is a process rather than a machine, a manufacture, or a 
composition of matter. See 35 U.S.C. § 101 (laying out these categories of patentable subject 
matter). In part, this is because the term “business method” cannot really be defined with any 
precision. See infra text accompanying notes 52–57. Moreover, the cases or statutes about 
business method patentability do not define the term. This may seem illogical—how can one 
assess if something is patentable without knowing what that something is? Patent law, 
unfortunately, is riddled with these sorts of inconsistencies. 
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result, the discussion turns to policy considerations and argues that 
the current statutory interpretation, which holds that most business 
processes are patentable unless Congress makes an exception, hurts 
innovation and provides the wrong incentives for many industries.21 
The en banc opinion of the Federal Circuit in Bilski nibbled around 
the edges of this problem, but did not resolve the matter. 
A. Wrestling with Indeterminacy 
The point of departure is the text of 35 U.S.C. § 101, which 
defines patentable subject matter: “Whoever invents or discovers any 
new and useful process, machine, manufacture, or composition of 
matter, or any new and useful improvement thereof, may obtain a 
patent . . . .”22 Since the statute states that “any new and useful 
process” and “any new and useful improvement” is patentable, the 
text does not appear to contemplate a categorical exception for so-
called “business methods.”23 This reading is buttressed by a 
statement in the legislative history of the 1952 Patent Act, which is 
frequently quoted by proponents of broad patentability, that § 101 
was intended to “include anything under the sun that is made by 
man.”24 
 
 21. The policy discussion is premised on the principle that patents serve a utilitarian 
purpose and are supposed to promote innovation. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8 (giving 
Congress the power “[t]o promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts, by securing for 
limited Times to Authors and Inventors the exclusive Right to their respective Writings and 
Discoveries”). 
 22. 35 U.S.C. § 101 (2006); see Diamond v. Diehr, 450 U.S. 175, 182 (1981) (stating 
that in 1952 Congress revised this section by replacing the word “art” with the word 
“process”). 
 23. See Kevin Emerson Collins, Claims to Interpretation Qua Information and a 
Structural Theory of Section 101, J.L. & POL’Y FOR INFO. SOC’Y 11, 15 (2008) (“[A] plain-
meaning textualist . . . might merely note that there is little to no statutory support for the 
exclusions as Section 101 merely states that ‘any new and useful process, machine, 
manufacture, or composition of matter’ is a patentable invention.”); see also In re Bilski, 545 
F.3d 943, 1012 (Fed. Cir. 2008) (en banc) (Rader, J., dissenting) (“The language of section 
101 conveys no implication that the Act extends patent protection to some subcategories of 
processes but not others. It does not mean ‘some’ or even ‘most,’ but all.”), cert. granted sub 
nom. Bilski v. Doll, 192 S. Ct. 2735 (2009). The courts do hold that “laws of nature, natural 
phenomena, and abstract ideas” are ineligible for patents, id. at 977, but those exclusions can 
be explained on the grounds that they are discovered, rather than invented, or are not useful 
within the meaning of the statute. 
 24. Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303, 309 (1980) (quoting S. REP. NO. 82-
1979, at 5 (1952); H.R. REP. NO. 82-1923, at 6 (1952)). Compare State St. Bank & Trust 
Co. v. Signature Fin. Group, Inc., 149 F.3d 1368, 1373 (Fed. Cir. 1998) (citing this line for 
the proposition that “it is improper to read limitations into § 101 on the subject matter that 
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Supporters of a business method exception have a robust 
response to these points, which is that when § 101 was last amended 
in 1952, and for decades thereafter, it was considered hornbook law 
that business methods were not patentable.25 Even Judge Giles Rich, 
who wrote the crucial Federal Circuit opinion in State Street Bank & 
Trust Co. v. Signature Financial Group, Inc.26 declaring that the 
business method exception never existed, relied on the exception in 
an earlier law review article.27 This consensus began to unravel in 
1980, when the Supreme Court quoted the “anything under the 
 
may be patented where the legislative history indicates that Congress clearly did not intend 
such limitations”), with BESSEN & MEURER, supra note 1, at 27 (“[W]e are troubled by the 
expansionist view of the courts that ‘everything under the sun made by man’ should be 
patentable, including software, business methods, and even mental correlations. . . . We are 
quite sure that the patent system needs to recognize the limits of its grasp, even if we are not 
sure of the best way to implement those limits.”). 
Some of the opinions in Bilski challenged the broad interpretation of the legislative 
history in the 1952 Act. For instance, Judge Dyk contended that the phrase “made by man” 
referred only to manufactures. See Bilski, 545 F.3d at 976 (Dyk, J., concurring). Likewise, 
Judge Mayer pointed out that the “anything under the sun” language was qualified in the 
report from Congress. See id. at 1000 (Mayer, J., dissenting) (noting that the report also said 
an invention “is not necessarily patentable under section 101 unless the conditions of the title 
are fulfilled”).  
 25. See In re Patton, 127 F.2d 324, 327–28 (C.C.P.A. 1942) (“[I]t is sufficient to say 
that a system of transacting business, apart from the means of carrying out such system, is not . 
. . patentable subject matter.”); Hotel Sec. Checking Co. v. Lorraine Co., 160 F. 467, 469 (2d 
Cir. 1908) (“A system of transacting business disconnected from the means of carrying out the 
system is not . . . an art. Advice is not patentable.”); Morton C. Jacobs, Note, The Patentability 
of Printed Matter: Critique and Proposal, 18 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 475, 476 (1950) (describing 
“the longstanding rule that abstractions, mental theories or business methods are not 
patentable subject matter” (footnote omitted)); Robert A. Kreiss, Patent Protection for 
Computer Programs and Mathematical Algorithms: The Constitutional Limitations on 
Patentable Subject Matter, 29 N.M. L. REV. 31, 85 (1999) (“[T]he repeated comments made 
by courts, commentators, and the PTO over the years to the effect that business methods are 
not patentable subject matter.”). 
 26. 149 F.3d 1368 (Fed. Cir. 1998). 
 27. See Giles S. Rich, Principles of Patentability, 28 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 393, 393–94 
(1960) (stating that business methods were not patentable); see also State St. Bank, 149 F.3d at 
1375 (“Since the 1952 Patent Act, business methods have been, and should have been, subject 
to the same legal requirements for patentability as applied to any other process or method.”); 
Meurer, supra note 18, at 320 n.70 (“Although I think his treatment of the cases is reasonable, 
Judge Rich evades the longstanding PTO rule against patents on business methods and the 
consensus among commentators, including himself at an earlier date, that there was a business 
method exception.”). 
While there are some pre-1952 patents that arguably did involve business methods, they 
do not establish that the exclusion of this category never existed. Compare Bilski, 545 F.3d at 
974 (Dyk, J., concurring) (distinguishing these patents on various grounds), with id. at 989–
90 (Newman, J., dissenting) (concluding from similar sources that business method patents 
were never excluded). 
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sun” language for the first time and set forth a strong presumption 
of patentability in a decision involving genetically engineered 
bacteria.28 One year later, the Court relied on that presumption to 
hold that a process for curing synthetic rubber in which software was 
the crucial component was patentable; a decision that was the chief 
authority for the Federal Circuit cases during the 1990s that 
expanded patentable subject matter.29 Nevertheless, a reasonable 
argument can be made that § 101 was enacted against the 
background assumption that business methods were not patentable 
and that the proper view of the statute was the one taken from the 
1950s until the 1990s.30 
 
 28. See Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. at 309; Collins, supra note 23, at 15 (noting “the 
establishment of a default in favor of patentability in Diamond v. Chakrabarty). 
 29. See Diamond v. Diehr, 450 U.S. 175, 185 (1981) (“[T]he fact that in several steps 
of the process a mathematical equation and a programmed digital computer are used [did not 
render the process unpatentable].”); State St. Bank, 149 F.3d at 1374 (reasoning that after 
Diehr “the mere fact that a claimed invention involves inputting numbers, calculating numbers, 
outputting numbers, and storing numbers, in and of itself, would not render it nonstatutory 
subject matter”); AT&T, Corp. v. Excel Comm., Inc., 172 F.3d 1352, 1356–57 (Fed. Cir. 
1999) (relying on an extended analysis of Diehr to validate a patent on a billing system for 
phone calls); Burk & McDonnell, supra note 15, at 984 (“[T]he acceptance of software within 
patentable subject matter undermined the prohibition on which the preclusion of business 
methods from patent law was also grounded.”). 
Diehr’s effort to distinguish the Court’s precedents rejecting software patents, especially 
Parker v. Flook, was unpersuasive and is widely criticized. Compare Diehr, 450 U.S. at 191–92 
& n.14 (arguing that “insignificant postsolution activity will not transform an unpatentable 
principle into a patentable process” and that the software in Flook involved insignificant activity 
during a catalytic conversion process), with id. at 204 (Stevens, J., dissenting) ([Flook] “made it 
clear that an improved method of calculation, even when employed as part of a physical 
process, is not patentable subject matter under § 101.”), and id. at 215 (“[T]he postsolution 
activity described in the Flook application was no less significant than the automatic opening of 
the curing mold involved in this case.”). See also Julie E. Cohen & Mark A. Lemley, Patent 
Scope and Innovation in the Software Industry, 89 CAL. L. REV. 1, 9 (2001) (“Diehr seems 
difficult to distinguish from Flook.”); Kevin Emerson Collins, Propertizing Thought, 60 SMU 
L. REV. 317, 349 (2007) (“Flook and Diehr are difficult to reconcile.”). Indeed, the 
incoherence of the Supreme Court’s cases on process patents helps explain why the Federal 
Circuit had such a hard time making sense of them in Bilski. See infra note 73.  
 30. The Supreme Court has not addressed § 101 since Diehr, and thus its grant of 
certiorari in Bilski will mark its first comment on the validity of business method patents. Cf. 
Collins, supra note 29, at 349–50 (“In large part because Diehr came after Flook, a default 
presumption of a method being applied rather than abstract has evolved over the last twenty-
five years in the Federal Circuit . . . .”).  
Once again, some of the opinions in Bilski made this point about the proper 
construction of § 101. See Bilski, 545 F.3d at 974 (Dyk, J., concurring) (arguing that patents 
were not granted before 1952 “on methods of organizing human activity not involving 
manufactures, machines or the creation of compositions of matter”); id. at 999 (Mayer, J., 
dissenting) (“Because there is nothing in the language of the 1952 Act, or its legislative 
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Not so fast, a supporter of business method patents would insist. 
While there were numerous cases before and after the 1952 Act that 
said business methods were unpatentable, none of those decisions 
actually held that this was so.31 In each case, the patent application 
was rejected on other grounds (e.g., obviousness or lack of 
novelty).32 Accordingly, the statements about business method 
patentability were dicta and did not put a gloss on the sweeping 
language of § 101.33 One response to this point, though, is that the 
absence of a holding on the issue is irrelevant since it “may simply 
reflect a widespread, unchallenged understanding that patentable 
subject matter did not extend so far.”34 An even more persuasive 
answer is that the patent bar clearly thought that the Federal Circuit 
changed the law in the 1990s, as reflected by statements at the time 
as well as by the sharp increase in self-styled business method patent 
applications that followed the State Street Bank decision.35 That 
 
history, to indicate that Congress intended to modify the rule against patenting business 
methods, we must presume that no change in the rule was intended.”).  
 31. See State St. Bank, 149 F.3d at 1375 (“The business method exception has never 
been invoked by this court, or the CCPA, to deem an invention unpatentable.”); Michael L. 
Fuelling, Manufacturing, Selling and Accounting: Patenting Business Methods, 76 J. PAT. & 
TRADEMARK OFF. SOC’Y 471, 471–72 (1994) (noting that some commentators have been 
pointing this out since the 1930s). 
 32. Compare Hotel Sec. Checking Co. v. Lorraine Co., 160 F. 467, 469 (2d Cir. 1908) 
(“A system of transacting business disconnected from the means of carrying out the system is 
not, within the most liberal interpretation of the term, an art. Advice is not patentable.”), with 
id. at 471 (“Admitting, arguendo, that a system such as Hicks describes is patentable, if 
absolutely novel, we are of the opinion that the improvements of Hicks over the system 
disclosed in the Smith patent are such as would occur to anyone conversant with the 
business.”). See also Jacobs, supra note 25, at 475 & n.1 (stating that the case law “held that 
abstract ideas such as business methods and systems of knowledge were nonpatentable subject 
matter” but then adding that “[e]ach of these cases held that the printed arrangement itself 
lacked invention”). 
 33. See State St. Bank, 149 F.3d at 1375 (“Application of this particular exception has 
always been preceded by a ruling based on some clearer concept of Title 35 or, more 
commonly, application of the abstract idea exception based on finding a mathematical 
algorithm.”).  
 34. Cotter, supra note 13, at 877.  
 35. See Allison & Hunter, supra note 17, at 730–31 (“[State Street Bank ] was quickly 
followed by a dramatic increase in the number of applications for and grants of business 
method patents.”); Meurer, supra note 18, at 313 (“The State Street decision set off a flood of 
e–commerce patents.”); Raskind, supra note 18, at 61 (“The Federal Circuit’s recent 
endorsement of patent protection for methods of doing business marks so sweeping a 
departure from precedent as to invite a search for its justification.”); see also Bilski, 545 F.3d at 
1004 (Mayer, J., dissenting) (commenting that business method patent applications increased 
more than tenfold after State Street Bank was decided). 
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reaction is hard to reconcile with the view that the lack of holdings 
barring these patents was especially meaningful.36 
In sum, the legal authorities that apply to business method 
patents are inconclusive.37 Both proponents and detractors of the 
current standard can marshal formidable arguments for their points 
of view. The discussion therefore turns to the policy implications of 
allowing patents on business processes. 
B. A Policy Stalemate 
Though the Federal Circuit’s cases largely ignore the policy 
questions raised by expanding patentable subject matter, there is no 
shortage of opinions about that topic in the law reviews. Once again, 
both sides make a persuasive case about the value (or lack thereof) of 
business method patents and about the choice between excluding 
them from patentability and retaining the default rule that they are 
patentable. While this may just mean that lawmakers face a tough 
decision on this issue, perhaps the problem is with the premise that 
an all-or-nothing solution is the only option. 
In the immediate aftermath of the liberalization of business 
method patentability, critics who were trying to gauge its impact 
offered several policy objections. First, they argued that allowing 
such patents would harm innovation by removing valuable ideas 
from the public domain; a claim backed up by a parade of horribles 
(not unlike the curve ball example) asking whether industry would 
have benefited from the patenting of the assembly line, just-in-time 
 
 36. For example, State Street Bank noted that prior to 1996 the Manual of Patent 
Examining Procedures (used as guidance within the PTO) stated that “[t]hough seemingly 
within the category of process or method, a method of doing business can be rejected as not 
being within the statutory classes.” State St. Bank, 149 F.3d at 1377 (quoting § 706.03(a)); see 
Meurer, supra note 18, at 320 n.70 (“Defenders of State Street admit this result, but blandly 
assert that State Street made practitioners aware of a class of inventions they previously 
overlooked.”).  
 37. Following the decision in State Street Bank, Congress did enact a law that provided 
a limited defense to infringement actions involving a business method patent (without defining 
a business method). See First Inventor Defense Act of 1999, Pub. L. No. 106-113, 113 Stat. 
1536 (codified at 35 U.S.C. § 273 (2006)) (providing an affirmative defense to patent 
infringement actions if the defendant had used a business method at least one year before the 
application was filed). It is wrong to say, however, that this should be treated as an 
endorsement of State Street Bank, especially since this provision remains untested in the courts. 
See Burk & McDonnell, supra note 15, at 1003 (“[This provision was not] well-drafted or 
considered, . . . is opaque and nearly incomprehensible, and . . . remain[s] obscure and largely 
unnoticed.”); see also Allison & Hunter, supra note 17, at 766 (stating that there were no 
reported cases on the First Inventor Defense Act as of 2006).  
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inventory, or the hub-and-spoke airline system.38 Second, the critics 
said that enlarging the universe of patentable processes would 
overwhelm the PTO in a “patent flood” and lead to the issuance of 
too many low-quality patents that produce nothing but nuisance 
litigation.39 Third, the critics maintained that business method 
patents were unnecessary, as ordinary market competition and the 
first-mover advantage provided sufficient incentives for creativity in 
this area.40 
The rebuttal to these initial criticisms is equally forceful and 
convincing. Michael Abramowicz and John F. Duffy, for example, 
support the concept of business method patents with the rationale 
that firms need incentives for “market experimentation” when first-
mover or branding advantages prove insufficient.41 Other scholars 
 
 38. See Dreyfuss, supra note 3, at 264 (“Think how the airline industry might now be 
structured if the first company to offer frequent flyer miles had enjoyed the sole right to award 
them or how differently mergers and acquisitions would be financed . . . if the use of junk 
bonds had been protected by a patent.”); Meurer, supra note 18, at 322 (“[B]asic business 
method innovations like the distribution system at Sears, the multi-divisional structure of the 
firm, and the Fed-Ex hub-and-spoke air delivery system are now likely to be patentable subject 
matter.”); Raskind, supra note 18, at 64–65 (“Henry Ford’s assembly line method of 
organizing production might also be characterized as a method of doing the business of 
automobile production.”). 
 39. See Dreyfuss, supra note 3, at 267–68 (“The first problem is one that concerns many 
observers of the patent system. It is the frequency with which the Patent Office issues patents 
on shockingly mundane business inventions.”); Robert P. Merges, One Hundred Years of 
Solicitude: Intellectual Property Law, 1900-2000, 88 CAL. L. REV. 2187, 2232 (2000) (“[T]he 
increased volume of patent applications stemming from this newly patentable subject matter 
has pushed the patent system into crisis.”); Meurer, supra note 18, at 309–10 (“The decline of 
the business method exception to patentability will increase the frequency of patent floods. . . . 
Patent floods strain the resources of the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office (PTO) and 
adversely affect the quality of issued patents.”). 
 40. See Dreyfuss, supra note 3, at 275 (“[N]either the free-rider nor the disclosure 
rationale justifies business method patents. Businesses are largely practiced in public. 
Accordingly, there is little need to especially encourage disclosure. Business methods are also 
hard to free ride on. They depend in strong ways on the social structure within the firms 
utilizing them—on compensation schemes, lines of reporting, supervising policies, and other 
business factors.”); Raskind, supra note 18, at 92 (“Nowhere in the substantial literature on 
innovation is there a statement that the United States economy suffers from a lack of 
innovation in methods of doing business.”); see also Bilski, 545 F.3d at 1005 (Mayer, J., 
dissenting) (“Business innovations, by their very nature, provide a competitive advantage and 
thus generate their own incentives.”). 
 41. See Michael Abramowicz & John F. Duffy, Intellectual Property for Market 
Experimentation, 83 N.Y.U. L. REV. 337, 340 (2008) (“[L]ate-entering competitors obtain 
two important second-mover advantages against early market experimenters. First, they do not 
have to bear the cost of investing in market development. Second, they can copy the first 
experimenter’s market success and avoid repeating its failures.”); id. at 344 (explaining that 
novel and nonobvious business method methods can involve “those cases where the market 
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argue that the novelty and nonobviousness requirements are more 
than able to screen out worthless patents, and they support that 
assertion with empirical research showing that business method 
patents are no lower in quality than other types of patents.42 Finally, 
many people say that the definition of a business method is so fuzzy 
that any attempt to bar its patentability can be evaded with skillful 
claim drafting, thus eliminating the exception was the correct choice 
because it reduced transaction costs for patents that would issue no 
matter what substantive test was used.43 
Sifted through a decade of experience with business method 
patents, it is fair to say that two policy arguments—one pro and one 
con—retain their vitality and must be confronted.44 Contrary to the 
hopes of their boosters, business method patents do perform poorly 
as compared to other patents in the sense that they are litigated far 
 
success is truly doubtful”). But see Dratler, supra note 18, at 845–47 (arguing that patent 
protection is appropriate only when there is a risk that the invention will fail to function at all, 
not when it will merely fail to succeed in the marketplace). 
To be fair, Abramowicz and Duffy do not endorse all business method patents or all of 
the Federal Circuit’s doctrines. See Abramowicz & Duffy, supra, at 398–99 (“Nor do we 
believe that business method patents and the watering down of the nonobviousness standard 
are necessarily positive developments. To the contrary, we believe these developments could 
lead to dramatically inefficient results unless other aspects of patent law are also modified.”).  
 42. See Allison & Tiller, supra note 18, at 1004 (“Overall, our data demonstrate that 
Internet business method patents were no worse than patents in general in the late 1990s. 
Indeed, our empirical evidence suggests that they may have been better than average.”); 
Collins, supra note 23, at 15 (“A more nuanced variant casts Section 101 as the vestigial 
appendix of patent doctrine . . . . [T]oday it is no longer necessary because any claim that is 
unpatentable under the patentable subject matter doctrine is also invalid under one of the 
now-refined invalidity doctrines.”). But see BESSEN & MEURER, supra note 1, at 188 
(criticizing Allison & Tiller’s definition of patent quality). Allison and Tiller defined business 
method patents by relying on the PTO’s classification of the applications, which is no more 
reliable than any other method but is better than nothing.  
 43. See Allison & Hunter, supra note 17, at 736 (“Carving out business method patent 
applications for harsher treatment would ultimately prove largely futile and possibly even 
counterproductive—futile because skilled patent attorneys can often draft applications so as to 
opt out of a predefined category, and counterproductive because of the increased transaction 
costs associated with tortuous drafting.”); see also Cohen & Lemley, supra note 29, at 9 
(describing “the doctrine of the magic words” that prevailed during the 1980s and early 
1990s, under which “software was patentable subject matter, but only if the applicant recited 
the magic words and pretended that she was patenting something else”). 
 44. The Panic of 2008 raises another question. Was the innovation in financial products 
over the last decade, spurred on by availability of business method patents, actually a good 
thing? The answer is far from clear. Perhaps the issue was the lack of regulation of these exotic 
products rather than their existence, but the assertion that innovation in the financial industry 
is always desirable must be subjected to critical review. 
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more often.45 A detailed study by James Bessen and Michael J. 
Meurer establishes that software and business method patents 
account for nearly forty percent of the total cost of patent litigation 
and that the problem is getting worse.46 Moreover, their data show 
that the patent system (outside of chemical and drug patents) is now 
providing a net disincentive for innovation; a result that is largely 
attributed to software and business method patents.47 The novelty 
and nonobviousness gatekeepers, in other words, are not preventing 
a patent flood or the costly nuisance lawsuits that critics said would 
follow from the Federal Circuit’s decisions.48 
What makes business method patents so litigation-prone is their 
abstract quality, which provides weak notice for firms and increases 
 
 45. See BESSEN & MEURER, supra note 1, at 22 (“Critically, software patents do seem to 
exhibit some marked differences from other patents when it comes to litigation costs. Software 
patents are more than twice as likely to be litigated as other patents; patents on methods of 
doing business, which are largely software patents, are nearly seven times more likely to be 
litigated.”). A similar pattern unfolded when the Patent Office expanded the subject matter 
covered by design patents in the late nineteenth century; an ill-fated experiment that led to 
another patent flood and a sharp increase in nuisance litigation. See Magliocca, supra note 19, 
at 1819–25 (describing this episode). 
 46. See BESSEN & MEURER, supra note 1, at 22; see also id. at 192–93 (presenting some 
data on this growing problem and stating that “software and business-method patents are 
different from most other patents, both in their litigation rates and frequency of claim-
construction problems.”). In this respect, Judge Newman’s dissent in Bilski was very 
disappointing. While her vigorous defense of process patents made many valid points, she also 
served up a rainbows-and-lollipops story that refused to acknowledge that these patents were 
presenting any problems. At one point, she did mention some of this criticism, but then 
quickly added that “this problem seems to be remedied.” See Bilski, 545 F.3d at 997 
(Newman, J., dissenting). That is nothing more than wishful thinking.  
 47. See BESSEN & MEURER, supra note 1, at 144 (“By the late 1990s the risk of patent 
litigation for public firms outside of the chemical and pharmaceutical industries exceeded the 
profits derived from patents. This means that patents likely provided a net disincentive for 
innovation for the firms who fund the lion’s share of industrial R&D; this is, patents tax 
R&D.”); cf. Bilski, 545 F.3d at 1004 (Mayer, J., dissenting) (providing a summary of absurd 
process patents granted by the PTO since State Street Bank).  
 48. A serious response to this point is that policymakers should focus on improving the 
statutory gatekeepers instead of narrowing § 101. See Michael Risch, Everything is Patentable, 
75 TENN L. REV. 591, 658 (2008) (“[T]he PTO and courts should focus on answering 
specific questions about how to best apply rigorous standards of novelty, nonobviousness, 
utility, and specification with a scapel rather than simply eliminating broad swaths of 
innovation with a machete.”); see also Kristin Osenga, Ants, Elephant Guns, and Statutory 
Subject Matter, 39 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 1087, 1092 (2007) (“[T]he question of subject-matter 
eligibility for any invention is essentially pro forma, and whether a patent is granted for a 
particular invention should be based on the application meeting the requirements of 
patentability provided by 35 U.S.C. § 102, 103, and 112.”). I address this point in Part II. See 
infra text accompanying notes 98–100. 
DO NOT DELETE 11/3/2009  10:01 AM 
BRIGHAM YOUNG UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW 2009 
888 
the probability of inadvertent infringement.49 As Bessen and Meurer 
observe, “it is well known among computer scientists that software 
technologies (algorithms, system structures) can be represented in 
many different ways, and . . . [t]his means that the technology 
claimed in a patent can be difficult to distinguish from 
alternatives.”50 The same holds true for most business methods, 
which often incorporate software or cover processes dealing with 
information management (e.g., financial instruments, negotiation 
tactics, styles of legal argument) that are subjective—an art rather 
than a science—and far less precise than a machine or a drug that can 
be described in concrete terms.51 To the extent that firms simply do 
not know where the boundaries of these patents are, they are more 
likely to infringe them.52 
While all of this suggests that business method patents pose a 
threat to innovation, the very indefiniteness that makes these patents 
problematic also impedes every proposal for reform. There is still no 
definition of a business method in federal law, and the argument that 
none can be written that would make sense has merit.53 One reason 
for this is that the definition is circular, as a business method is just a 
method used to conduct business.54 Put another way, any process 
 
 49. See BESSEN & MEURER, supra note 1, at 23 (“[S]oftware patents are much more 
likely than other patents to have their claim construction reviewed on appeal—an implicit 
indication that parties to lawsuits have fundamental uncertainty over the boundaries of these 
patents.”); Magliocca, supra note 19, at 1821–22 (pointing out that the same kind of 
boundary confusion arose in the nineteenth century when the Patent Office allowed design 
patents to issue on common functional items such as farm tools). 
 50. BESSEN & MEURER, supra note 1, at 23. 
 51. See id. at 198 (noting that courts have traditionally resisted patents on “principles of 
manufacture” for this reason and giving as an example Justice Story’s rejection of a patent on 
“the art of cutting ice by means of any power, other than human power”). 
 52. See Magliocca, supra note 19, at 1815 (explaining how this can lead to substantial 
sunk costs that an opportunistic litigant can exploit). 
 53. See, e.g., Fuelling, supra note 31, at 480 (“[T]he decisional law never defines the 
term ‘method of doing business.’”). One bill introduced, but never passed, in the House of 
Representatives tried to define a business method as:  
(1) a method of – (A) administering, managing, or otherwise operating an enterprise 
or organization, including a technique used in doing or conducting business; or (B) 
processing financial data; (2) any technique used in athletics, instruction, or personal 
skills; and (3) any computer-assisted implementation of a method described in 
paragraph (1) or a technique described in paragraph (2).  
Business Method Patent Improvement Act of 2000, H.R. 5364, 106th Cong. (2000).  
 54. See Allison & Hunter, supra note 17, at 767 (emphasizing this point). Dissenting in 
Bilski, Judge Mayer countered that a technological arts standard should be used to distinguish 
patentable subject-matter from business methods. He said “a claimed process is technological 
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within an industry could be described as that industry’s method of 
doing business. For example, some wonder if “a chemical refining 
process would be a business method for a firm in the business of 
refining petroleum products. Although probably not within the 
contemplation of most people who have given thought to business 
methods, why would the refining process not be included within 
such a definition?”55 The answer, of course, is that chemical refining 
processes are not harming the patent system and have been covered 
by § 101 without controversy for decades—neither of which can be 
said about business method and software patents.56 Finding a 
formula that can capture that insight, though, is proving so elusive 
that even the most ardent critics of the Federal Circuit hesitate when 
it comes to the question of what should be done.57 
One other facet of the process patent issue deserves some 
attention, and that is how the expansion of patentable subject matter 
affects the norms within particular business and professional groups. 
Some of the most exciting intellectual property research being done 
today focuses on how communities that are excluded from effective 
patent or copyright protection, such as chefs, magicians, and stand-
up comedians, develop informal practices that govern ownership of 
and access to their creative material.58 While this could be viewed as 
 
to the extent it applies laws of nature to new ends,” whereas “a process is non-technological 
where its inventive concept is the application of principles drawn not from the natural sciences 
but from disciplines such as business, law, sociology, or psychology.” In re Bilski, 545 F.3d 
943, 1009–10 (Fed. Cir. 2008) (en banc) (Mayer, J., dissenting), cert. granted sub nom. Bilski 
v. Doll, 192 S. Ct. 2735 (2009). But software does not fit into this framework unless Judge 
Mayer is suggesting that software should not be patentable. 
 55. Allison & Tiller, supra note 18, at 1019–20 n.104. This problem becomes even 
more complicated if software is included in the chemical process, which was the situation that 
the Court addressed in Diehr. See supra text accompanying note 30. 
 56. See BESSEN & MEURER, supra note 1, at 153 (stating that chemical patents are 
valuable in part because they are not frequently litigated); id. at 189 (“Chemical processes have 
always been patentable and have never been controversial in the United States.”). 
 57. See supra text accompanying note 1.  
 58. See, e.g., Emmanuelle Fauchart & Eric Von Hippel, Norms-Based Intellectual 
Property Systems: The Case of French Chefs, M.I.T. Sloan Research Paper No. 4576-06 (Jan. 1, 
2006), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=881781; Jacob 
Loshin, Secrets Revealed How Magicians Protect Intellectual Property Without Law, (July 25, 
2007), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=100 5564; Dotan Oliar & Christopher 
Sprigman, There’s No Free Laughs (anymore): The Emergence of Intellectual Property Norms and 
the Transformation of Stand-Up Comedy, 94 VA. L. REV. 1787 (2008); see also Kal Raustiala & 
Christopher Sprigman, The Piracy Paradox: Innovation and Intellectual Property in Fashion 
Design, 92 VA. L. REV. 1687, 1769–75 (2006) (listing other examples such as fireworks, 
perfume, tattoos, and hairstyles).  
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just making the best of a bad situation, there is every reason to think 
that these customs (as in the curve ball example) actually encourage 
more sharing of knowledge and lower transaction costs in a way that 
makes the trade as a whole better off.59 The chief threat to this sort 
of arrangement comes from defectors who can gain from violating 
these norms (e.g., copying without attribution) and hence must be 
reined in by some sort of informal sanctions lest the system 
collapse.60 
Introducing patents into these communities undermines their 
indigenous customs and gives more leverage to defectors without 
generating significant benefits.61 It is not breaking news to say that 
law shapes norms, so when the doctrine holds that a business process 
can be owned outright and does not need to be shared, that change 
is bound to weaken any contrary cooperative practices.62 For 
instance, when Congress enacted the Bayh-Dole Act to encourage 
the patenting of inventions in universities, observers noted that this 
eroded the prior ethos that professors would share their research 
freely with others.63 The availability of patents also puts a potent 
 
 59. See supra text accompanying notes 8–10; Rothman, supra note 13, at 1924 
(“[W]here parties either think that formal IP law has little or no role, or where legal 
enforcement of existing IP laws is expressly disfavored by the community[,] . . . the practices 
and norms that develop often reflect community members’ preferred distribution of rights in 
intangible goods.”); Thomas, supra note 11, at 1176 (“[T]he ability of a profession to serve 
the public good may also be affected by patenting, which could alter the willingness of 
professionals to disseminate and put into practice new learning.”).  
 60. A familiar (perhaps all-too familiar) example of this would be the way that federal 
appellate judges hire clerks. If everyone involved in that process sticks to a common 
understanding about a timeframe for receiving applications and conducting interviews, then 
the process as a whole works better. There will always be an incentive, however, for some 
judges to jump the gun. Whether shaming the renegades actually works is a question I shall 
not attempt to answer. 
 61. One objection is that an anti-patent norm could be an anti-competitive device that 
leaders in an industry use to preserve their position against potential challengers. In other 
words, the power to create norms and patents are the only way that the little guy can fight 
back. I do not think that this is an accurate description of how cooperative market niches 
operate, but I accept that courts must independently review a custom to make sure that it is 
consistent with public policy. See The T. J. Hooper, 60 F.2d 737, 740 (2d Cir. 1932) (L. 
Hand, J.) (making the classic statement about the connection between custom and 
negligence). My argument is that courts should defer to an industry norm against patents 
unless an applicant can demonstrate that the norm is unreasonable. 
 62. The high cost of obtaining a patent may protect a community from norm erosion by 
making it impractical for anyone to obtain one. Even if joke-telling were deemed a business 
method for a stand-up comic, it is hard to believe that any comic would bother spending the 
necessary time and money to get a patent. 
 63. See, e.g., Arti Rai, Regulating Scientific Research: Intellectual Property Rights and the 
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weapon in the hands of any would-be defectors. Although they 
could still face reputational sanctions if they choose to apply for a 
patent rather than make their discoveries freely available, those 
disciplinary measures may not be enough if the patent is truly 
valuable.64 As a result, patents not only undermine sharing norms by 
making ownership more acceptable, they also limit the ability of 
professions to maintain their integrity against cheaters from inside 
and outside their ranks.65 
Under the current “opt-out” posture taken by the Federal 
Circuit, if the American Medical Association wanted to prevent 
someone like Michael Debakey from patenting the heart bypass 
surgery procedure, its only hope would be to ask Congress for a 
statutory exemption. With respect to surgical and medical patents, 
Congress did, in fact, grant such an exemption.66 But for the vast 
majority of professional groups that reject patents, this is no remedy 
at all because of the prohibitive costs of lobbying.67 Besides, it is not 
at all clear that those who care about the patent system would want 
 
Norms of Science, 94 NW. U. L. REV. 77, 109 (1999) (“As might be predicted by law-and-
norms theory . . . universities and individual researchers soon began to respond to the financial 
incentives of Bayh-Dole by rejecting communalism and increasing efforts to seek patents.”). 
 64. A standard-setting organization can solve this coordination problem, much as a 
sports league does, by imposing rules on its members with respect to patents, but that often 
does not work. See Robert P. Merges & Jeffrey M. Kuhn, An Estoppel Doctrine for Patented 
Standards, 97 CAL. L. REV. 1 (2009) (discussing strategic behavior by firms facing these 
standard-setting groups). 
 65. Of course, one person’s cheater is another person’s innovator. The norm of warfare 
during the Revolutionary War was to stand in formation and shoot it out, thus our soldiers 
were cheating by attacking the Redcoats from behind trees and rocks. I am not saying that 
cheating is always wrong. I am just saying that its fruits should not be patentable under the 
conditions outlined in this Article. 
 66. See Omnibus Consolidated Appropriations Act, 1997, Limitation on Patent 
Infringements Relating to a Medical Practitioner’s Performance of a Medical Activity, Pub. L. 
No. 104-208, 110 Stat. 3009, § 616 (codified as amended at 35 U.S.C. § 287(c) (2006)) 
(barring infringement remedies, and thereby effectively nullifying, medical and surgical 
procedure patents); Thomas, supra note 11, at 1176 (stating that this action came after 
“condemnation of patents on methods of medical treatment by the American Medical 
Association House of Delegates”). But cf. Allison & Tiller, supra note 18, at 1020 (“Even if 
one believes that it was socially optimal to remove the threat of an infringement action so as to 
give physicians the freedom to use any procedure they choose, it is unlikely that a reasonable 
estimate of costs and benefits would lead to the same conclusion for business methods.”).  
 67. See Thomas, supra note 11, at 1177 (“Whether business and other professionals will, 
like physicians, possess the wherewithal to persuade Congress to create particularized patent-
free spheres of activity remains to be seen. Few occupations are as well-organized, imbued with 
a sense of profession and capable of employing the rhetoric of public service as the practice of 
medicine.”).  
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Congress involved in these issues. Dan Burk and Brett H. 
McDonnell point out that on “the rare occasion when legislative 
response has occurred, there is usually reason to wish that it hadn’t. 
The previous history of remedial legislation regarding patentable 
subject matter is not encouraging.”68 What these professions really 
need is an “opt-in” system with a presumption against patentability 
unless they want to participate in the patent system. The problem, of 
course, is that business methods must be defined for that solution to 
work. 
Accordingly, the policy debate over business method patents, like 
the discussion over the positive legal materials governing them, is 
indeterminate. On the one hand, there is considerable proof that the 
interpretation adopted by the Federal Circuit is a harmful tax on 
innovation. On the other hand, the definitional challenge makes it 
very tricky to replace the current test with one that will abolish the 
harmful patents without taking out the valuable ones.69 
C. The Federal Circuit’s Opinion in Bilski 
In response to all of this criticism about business method patents, 
the Federal Circuit went en banc in 2008 and revisited its 
precedents.70 While the court reaffirmed that business methods are 
patentable, Bilski revised the test for assessing process patents.71 Ever 
since State Street Bank was issued in 1998, any process that yielded a 
“useful, concrete, tangible result” was deemed patentable under § 
101.72 Following an analysis of the most recent Supreme Court cases 
on the issue (all of which are nearly thirty years old), Bilski held that 
this standard should be replaced by a machine-or-transformation test 
 
 68. Burk & McDonnell, supra note 15, at 1003. 
 69. See Dratler, supra note 18, at 879 (“The Federal Circuit’s ultimate solution—
virtually abandoning judgment and rejecting all categorical subject-matter limitations for 
computer programs entirely—can be understood primarily as a desperate search for certainty in 
an uncertain world.” (footnote omitted)). 
 70. See In re Bilski, 545 F.3d 943, 1010 (Fed. Cir. 2008) (en banc) (Mayer, J., 
dissenting) (“We took this case en banc in a long-overdue effort to resolve primal questions on 
the metes and bounds of statutory subject matter. The patent system has run amok, and the 
USPTO, as well as the larger patent community, has actively sought guidance from this court 
in making sense of our section 101 jurisprudence.”), cert. granted sub nom. Bilski v. Doll, 192 
S. Ct. 2735 (2009). 
 71. See id. at 960 (reaffirming the conclusion in State Street Bank that business methods 
as a class are patentable). 
 72. See id. at 959 (describing the standard associated with State Street Bank).  
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that asks whether a process “is tied to a particular machine or 
apparatus” or “transforms a particular article into a different state or 
thing.”73 
These new restrictions on patentable subject-matter are a modest 
improvement over the previous standard. One of the most notable 
aspects of Bilski was its rejection of patents for purely mental 
calculations such as the commodity hedging strategy developed by 
the applicant in that case.74 The Federal Circuit said that a “claimed 
process wherein all of the process steps may be performed entirely in 
the human mind is obviously not tied to any machine and does not 
transform any article into a different state or thing. As a result, it 
would not be patent-eligible under § 101.”75 Under that analysis, 
some business processes would clearly be excluded, such as a new 
style of argument in a courtroom or a better technique for haggling. 
The application of the “machine-or-transformation” test with 
respect to most process patents, however, is very unclear and may 
just end up providing more gainful employment for lawyers who 
 
 73. See id. at 952–58 (discussing the case law and restating the operative test); id. at 959 
(“[W]hile looking for ‘a useful, concrete, and tangible result’ may in many instances provide 
useful indications of whether a claim is drawn to a fundamental principle or a practical 
application of such a principle, that inquiry is insufficient to determine whether a claim is 
patent-eligible under § 101.”). While I want to focus on the practical implications of Bilski, 
there are some things worth saying about the Federal Circuit’s analysis. The chief flaw in the 
“machine-or-transformation” standard is that the Supreme Court once expressly disclaimed 
that this was the sole test for process patentability. See Gottschalk v. Benson, 409 U.S. 63, 71 
(1972) (“It is argued that a process patent must either be tied to a particular machine or 
apparatus or must operate to change articles or materials to a ‘different state or thing.’ We do 
not hold that no process patent could ever qualify if it did not meet the requirements of our 
prior precedents.”). The majority in Bilski concluded that the Court’s omission of this 
qualification in a later decision meant that the “machine-or-transformation” test should be 
read as exclusive. See Bilski, 545 F.3d at 956 (“[T]his caveat was not repeated in Diehr when 
the Court reaffirmed the machine-or-transformation test.”). This is a highly dubious (or, to be 
more polite, creative) interpretation of the cases. See id. at 982 (Newman, J., dissenting) (“It 
cannot be inferred that the Court silently imposed such a rule.”). The problem for the Federal 
Circuit, though, is that the Supreme Court’s cases on this question are a mess. See generally 
Rich, supra note 27. This helps explain why—right after Bilski’s attempt to reconcile these 
authorities—the en banc court suggested that review by the Justices was warranted. See Bilski, 
545 F.3d at 956.  
 74. See Bilski, 545 F.3d at 949 (calling the claim “a method of hedging risk in the field 
of commodities trading”); id. at 963 (“Purported transformations or manipulations simply of 
public or private legal obligations or relationships, business risks, or other such abstractions 
cannot meet the test because they are not physical objects or substances, and they are not 
representative of physical objects or substances.”). 
 75. Id. at 961 n.26. 
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excel at claim drafting.76 First, the court declined to address the issue 
of “whether or when recitation of a computer suffices to tie a process 
claim to a particular machine.”77 This is a major omission since many 
business methods can be redrafted to include some connection with 
a computer (as software, for instance). Second, Bilski did not offer 
any helpful guidance on what was required to meet the 
transformation prong of the new test. As one dissenter said, “nearly 
every process claim can be rewritten to include a physical 
transformation.”78 Thus, the litigation of these patents will probably 
not decrease if the Supreme Court adopts the standard articulated by 
the Federal Circuit.79 
Here is the bottom line: The legal materials and the policy 
arguments do not resolve the question of whether business methods 
should be patentable if that question is whether they should always 
or never be patentable. My conclusion, however, is that this is the 
wrong approach. Instead, § 101 should be read through a flexible 
standard that looks at the norms within particular communities, to 
the extent that is possible, and holds that processes cannot generally 
be patented when industry customs are hostile to the idea. 
II. BRINGING CUSTOM INTO PATENT LAW 
This Part lays out an alternative interpretation of § 101 that 
would require the PTO and the courts to evaluate whether an 
“ordinary person skilled in the art” would consider the type of 
process at issue patentable subject matter. If the answer is no, then 
the patent should be denied unless the applicant can show that the 
 
 76. See id. at 1008 (Mayer, J., dissenting) (“The majority’s proposed ‘machine-or-
transformation test’ for patentability will do little to stem the growth of patents on non-
technological methods and ideas. Quite simply, in the context of business method patent 
applications, the majority’s proposed standard can be too easily circumvented.”); id. at 1015 
(Rader, J., dissenting) (stating that “this opinion propagates unanswerable questions” and then 
listing several). 
 77. Id. at 962. 
 78. Id. at 1008 (Mayer, J., dissenting); see id. at 1010 (Mayer, J., dissenting) 
(“[A]lthough this court has struggled for years to set out what constitutes sufficient physical 
transformation to render a process patentable, we have yet to provide a consistent or 
satisfactory resolution of this issue.”). 
 79. See id. at 1010 (Mayer, J., dissenting) (“The majority . . . fails to enlighten three of 
the thorniest issues in the patentability thicket: (1) the continued viability of business method 
patents, (2) what constitutes sufficient physical transformation or machine-implementation to 
render a process patentable, and (3) the extent to which computer software and computer-
implemented processes constitute statutory subject-matter.”). 
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anti-patent norm is unreasonable. That approach, which draws on 
the nonobviousness standard in § 103, would force policymakers to 
defer to cooperative industry norms but would not have to define 
business methods to do so.80 The analysis then explores how this 
approach might work in practice and considers some possible 
objections. 
A. Expanding the Horizon of the Reasonable Person 
Let us begin with an observation about business methods, which 
is that, unlike other types of inventions, they generally evolve in the 
heat of market competition rather than in a laboratory.81 Opponents 
of business method patents use this point to say that there is no need 
for the extra incentives provided by intellectual property, but another 
way to think about this is that “[t]he interactive responses that shape 
business methods are largely shaped by customary practices.”82 In 
other words, the unique characteristics of each market niche play a 
major role in determining how firms organize themselves and relate 
to consumers. As many unsuccessful entrepreneurs learn the hard 
way, developing a better product or a more efficient way of doing 
things is not always enough. Market expectations, which can be set 
by players within an industry or by consumers, often determine what 
is acceptable in a way that is hard for outsiders to understand. 
Given the importance of market norms in framing business 
methods, a question that arises is who knows more about whether 
patents will lead to better processes: the people in that industry or 
lawmakers? When the tax bar loudly protested the suggestion that 
tax shelters could be patented, one recent article pooh-poohed these 
objections as “anxiety bordering on panic.”83 Now that may be true, 
but the confident assertion that patents are good for you even when 
 
 80. See 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) (2006). 
 81. See Raskind, supra note 18, at 81 (“Courts should give weight to the fact that 
business methods are not derived from laboratory research and experimentation, but evolve 
and are implemented in an environment of rivalry and emulation.”); see also Meurer, supra note 
18, at 315 (stating that business processes usually fall into two categories – administrative 
methods and customer service methods – that deal with how firms handle market constraints). 
Just to be clear, this is not a definition of business methods. It is only a trait that is helpful in 
framing the subsequent analysis.  
 82. Raskind, supra note 18, at 81. 
 83. Burk & McDonnell, supra note 15, at 982; see also id. (“[O]nce business methods 
are allowed as patentable subject matter, the presence of tax shelters among such methods is 
neither much of a doctrinal novelty nor much of a surprise.”).  
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you think they are not should at least give one pause.84 In the case of 
software, most programmers adamantly opposed patents throughout 
the entire debate about whether § 101 should be extended over their 
work, and even now, firms outside of the software business acquire 
most software patents.85 Nevertheless, these concerns were waved off 
with equally confident and, as it turned out, false claims that 
software patents would not cause any significant problems. 
What makes this issue especially interesting is that when it comes 
to determining whether a particular invention (or business method) 
is obvious, lawmakers do defer to industry expertise in the form of 
the “ordinary person skilled in the art” standard. While the PTO or 
the courts must make an independent judgment on this legal 
question, it is inconceivable that either body would reject the 
uniform advice of scientists or engineers on the ground that they 
really do not know an obvious invention when they see one. In this 
instance, the law recognizes that the subtleties of technology are too 
complex for non-specialists to grasp and that patentability cannot be 
determined by a rule. The same logic, in my view, applies to the 
nuances of how individual markets function and should frame how 
business method patents are handled.86 
B. The Operational Test 
Accordingly, my solution is to take the “ordinary person” 
standard and expand its reach to ask whether that same reasonable 
member of a technical or business community would think that the 
claim genre is patentable subject matter. This view of § 101 would 
explicitly incorporate industry customs into the analysis and offers 
several advantages over the current approach.87 
 
 84. Perhaps this is a closer question since legal academics might know a great deal about 
tax law. In my experience, though, tax lawyers are specialists whose work is incomprehensible 
to those in other legal disciplines. 
 85. See BESSEN & MEURER, supra note 1, at 189–90 (describing the opposition and 
stating that only 5% of software patents come from within the industry); id. at 189 (“[S]uch 
broad opposition from within the affected industry and among the affected inventors seems to 
be unprecedented in U.S. patent history.”). 
 86. Cf. Cotter, supra note 13, at 883 (“All of this reasoning leads me to conclude that, 
despite some potential drawbacks, the technological arts, mental steps, and physical 
transformation doctrines may have possessed some underappreciated virtues. Abandoning them 
entirely, in the interest of attaining a more rational, logical patent system, may well have been 
precipitate.”). 
 87. There might be a difference between the § 101 ordinary observer and the § 103 
version, in the sense that the latter focuses on the technical aspects of an invention whereas the 
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First, by imposing a higher burden on business method claim 
applicants, this test will reduce the number of these patents that are 
issued. It is hard to say how large that reduction will be or whether 
the new standard will target the most problematic patents (more on 
that in a moment).88 But given the enormous litigation costs 
imposed by software and business method patents, anything that 
reduces their ranks without causing other problems would be 
welcome. At the same time, an “ordinary person” construction of  
§ 101 would allow some business method patents to go through. In 
essence, the result would be a compromise between those who want 
to eliminate these patents and those who support the current liberal 
interpretation. 
Second, using a somewhat vague and fact-intensive standard for 
this inquiry would go a long way towards solving the definitional 
issue that is tying the current debate into knots. Instead of setting 
forth a categorical exclusion (or inclusion) that will almost certainly 
founder on the circularity of a business method, the definition will 
be supplied by industry participants on a case-by-case basis. Such a 
test should also alleviate concerns that long-established patent types 
(e.g., chemical processes) will be swept under any new restrictions. 
Where plentiful prior art exists, claimants will have no problem 
establishing, either with that evidence alone or with a few affidavits, 
that the custom of their trade supports patentability.  
Third, the suggested expansion of the ordinary person test 
should not produce an intolerable level of uncertainty because the 
PTO, the courts, and applicants are already familiar with this test. 
The evidence that would be considered and the way in which it is 
interpreted would be similar to an obviousness inquiry. Prior art 
would naturally be relevant to the question of whether a particular 
industry thinks its discoveries are patentable.89 So would expert 
testimony from people in the field or material from secondary 
sources such as trade journals. Using industry norms to interpret  
§ 101 will create some uncertainty, but it is hard to say that this will 
 
former will be more interested in its commercial aspects. This distinction, though, does not 
diminish the value of the analogy. 
 88. See infra text accompanying notes 98–102. 
 89. When courts or examiners are confronted by some patents in the trade and must 
determine whether that amount is sufficient to justify the conclusion that no anti-patent norm 
exists, the question of who is taking out these patents would be relevant. For example, if a 
major firm in the industry is the source of prior art, that would be powerful evidence against 
such a custom. 
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be more unclear than the Bilski standard.90 Will patent lawyers try to 
find ways to draft their claims so that an invention does not fall 
within a prohibited category? Of course they will. Nevertheless, the 
question of “What business is this process in?” should be easier to 
resolve than “What is a business method?” The former inquiry is 
often undertaken in antitrust, for example, to determine if a firm is 
monopolizing a particular market, and this does not seem to present 
significant difficulties.91 
Finally, adopting an ordinary person test for subject-matter 
patentability would allow professions that do not want patents to be 
free from them unless they opt-in. This will facilitate their autonomy 
and let those with better information about market conditions make 
the call on whether patents are worthwhile.92 In more organized 
trades, a professional association could take a position on 
patentability that would send a clear signal.93 Of course, this does 
suggest that the meaning of § 101 can change over time as a 
community reassesses the wisdom of patents. Since norms tend to be 
rather sticky, though, this probably does not inject an undue amount 
of doubt into the reliance interests served by patents.94 
 
 90. Judge Newman was correct in her Bilski dissent when she said that “[u]ncertainty is 
the enemy of innovation.” In re Bilski, 545 F.3d 943, 977 (Fed. Cir. 2008) (en banc) 
(Newman, J., dissenting), cert. granted sub nom. Bilski v. Doll, 192 S. Ct. 2735 (2009). The 
pre-Bilski approach, though, just shifted that uncertainty from the application stage to the 
litigation stage. 
 91. See, e.g., United States v. Microsoft, 253 F.3d 34, 51–55 (D.C. Cir. 2001) (en 
banc) (defining the relevant market for operating systems). 
 92. See Rothman, supra note 13, at 1908 (“Customary practices or norms that develop 
with the express purpose of formulating an aspirational set of practices should be given more 
weight than those that develop simply to avoid litigation or to preserve relationships.”). There 
might be a concern that new industries would not be able to avail themselves of patents 
because there would be no community view of what should be done with processes. This is not 
true, however, because the test proposed here says that courts should defer only to an anti-
patent norm, not that the lack of a norm should be used to draw an adverse inference against 
subject-matter patentability. 
 93. See Thomas, supra note 11, at 1176 (“[T]he tendency of professions to organize 
suggests that a vocal and established lobby will be on hand to debate the place of patenting 
within particular professional communities.”). This proposal enhances the role of professional 
associations, since their declarations about patents would carry a lot of weight. If insiders who 
are not representative of the community as a whole control these groups, then that would be a 
problem. 
 94. One concern whenever norms are introduced is circularity. In other words, does a 
legal declaration that certain processes are patentable make people believe that they are and 
change the relevant norm, or does a contrary finding create a norm against patents? I do not 
think this is a problem. With respect to software and financial patentability, there was a 
vigorous debate while the law held that they were generally not patentable. Likewise, there are 
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C. The Relationship Between § 101 and § 103 
 
 Before examining how an “ordinary person” test might apply to 
software, let me address two arguments against my position. Both 
turn on how the subject-matter examination and the nonobviousness 
gatekeeper should relate to each other. 
One problem with borrowing from § 103 to interpret § 101 is 
that § 103 contains language about the “ordinary person skilled in 
the art” and § 101 does not. Does this mean that § 101 cannot be 
read in the way that this Article suggests? I think not. First, a norm-
based interpretation would fulfill the purpose of the statute in a 
manner consistent with its goals and structure. Second, the 
consensus that business methods were not patentable when the 1952 
Act was enacted can be construed as implying that there is an 
ordinary person limit on § 101, since anti-patent norms did exist at 
the time within the relevant communities. Third, this is not the kind 
of statutory construction that was criticized by the dissenters in 
Parker v. Flook.95 Justice Potter Stewart argued there that the Court 
“strikes what seems to me an equally damaging blow at basic 
principles of patent law by importing into its inquiry under 35 
U.S.C. § 101 the criteria of novelty and nonobviousness.”96 I am not 
suggesting, however, that courts examine the obviousness of a 
process (or any component of that process) as Flook did. 
If these responses are unpersuasive, though, then another way of 
thinking about the issue is that industry norms could be treated as a 
secondary factor to supplement any test that the Justices fashion in 
Bilski. This reading also borrows from the Court’s analysis of § 103, 
which gives the PTO and the lower courts some objective factors to 
determine whether an invention is obvious.97 None of these factors 
are in the statutory language, but they are rather helpful. The same 
approach could be applied to § 101 without doing violence to the 
statutory text. A secondary factor suggested by Bilski is that a process 
involving “purely mental steps” should not be patentable. The 
 
communities that continue to resist patents, such as the tax bar, long after State Street Bank. 
 95. 437 U.S. 584 (1978). 
 96. Id. at 600 (Stewart, J., dissenting). 
 97. Graham v. John Deere Co., 383 U.S. 1, 17 (1966) (“Such secondary considerations 
as commercial success, long felt but unsolved needs, failure of others, etc. [can be used to 
assess obviousness].”). 
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existence of an anti-patent norm within the relevant trade could be 
another. Accordingly, the lack of explicit language in § 101 
supporting an “ordinary person” test does not mean that the basic 
idea cannot be incorporated into the provision. 
The other question is whether a better solution would be to 
enforce § 103 more rigorously instead of borrowing from it to shore 
up § 101.98 While the failure of the gatekeepers (novelty, 
enablement, and nonobviousness) to prevent the proliferation of 
harmful process patents is now clear, there is always a chance that 
they could be improved. Furthermore, many negative determinations 
on subject matter, including the hedging method in Bilski, are often 
using § 101 as a proxy for the other gatekeepers.99 If that is the case, 
then why not just use these statutory requirements instead of 
blending them in some fashion with § 101? One answer is that the 
curve ball example shows that the subject-matter analysis is not 
always a proxy—there are cases where a broader policy concern is at 
issue. 
A more powerful response is that there is no evidence that 
relying on §§ 102, 103, or 112 will solve the problem.100 This claim 
was made ten years ago. It is still being made now. At what point 
does this argument run out of credibility? My conclusion is that this 
approach can never work without significant reforms to the Patent 
Office. Administrative costs are the key. A § 101 analysis, informed 
by industry practices, will give better guidance to overworked patent 
examiners by declaring entire classes of processes off-limits. Refining 
the application of the other statutory factors, by contrast, still makes 
them consider each patent claim independently, and experience 
suggests that this will ensure a significant error rate. Perhaps shifting 
the focus to § 101 is a second-best solution, but that beats no 
 
 98. See Risch, supra note 48, at 606 (“Under rigorous patentability, concerns about 
patentable subject matter are addressed primarily by the application of the patent requirements 
on a case-by-case basis. These requirements must be (a) systematic, logical, and as consistent as 
possible; (b) based on adherence to the statutory language; and (c) applied with a goal that 
only patents deserving of protection are issued.”). 
 99. See Osenga, supra note 48, at 1111 (“Because § 101 presents a threshold issue to be 
determined early in the examination process, by availing itself of this provision the Patent 
Office can avoid the often-problematic examination of software-related innovations.”). 
 100. See Meurer, supra note 18, at 334 n.132 (rejecting the view that tradeoffs involved 
in judging business method patents “should be implemented on a case-by-case via the 
nonobviousness standard of § 103 . . . . I would respond by claiming that cost savings justify 
exclusion of business methods [under] § 101 because a proper nonobviousness analysis (based 
on the economic trade-off) would deny patents to most business method patent innovations”). 
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solution. 
 
D. The Application to Software 
 
The most important question that would arise if this proposal 
were adopted involves software patents. It is probably the case that 
professions or industries that have resisted business method patents 
thus far (law, medicine, sports, etc.) would find shelter under an 
ordinary observer standard. While this would be a positive outcome, 
as a practical matter these are not the patents that are causing most 
of the problems.101 Software and the business methods that use 
software, not curve balls, are the source of the high litigation costs 
that are hurting innovation. My tentative conclusion is that the 
application of an ordinary person test would at least curb software 
patents and could lead to their abolition. No firm judgment can be 
made on this point, however, without further study. 
Identifying a norm within a community that includes Richard 
Stallman and Steve Ballmer is, to put it mildly, challenging.102 There 
is some evidence of antipathy towards patents from software firms 
and programmers based on their past resistance and on the fact that 
most people within the industry do not patent their work.103 
Nevertheless, there are plenty of people in the business who take the 
opposite view (and not just at Microsoft).104 Without a more detailed 
examination of attitudes and practices in that business, however, it is 
impossible to say whether a patentability norm exists or, if it does, 
what it covers. In other words, an ordinary person test could end 
 
 101. See BESSEN & MEURER, supra note 1, at 214 (“[S]oftware patents likely have a far 
greater influence on the performance of the patent system than do nonsoftware business 
processes.”). 
 102. See generally RICHARD M. STALLMAN, FREE SOFTWARE, FREE SOCIETY: SELECTED 
ESSAYS OF RICHARD M. STALLMAN (Joshua Gay ed., 2002) (setting forth his influential ideas 
about open source software and criticizing the proprietary model). 
 103. See supra text accompanying note 85. This is why, according to Bessen and Meurer, 
a proliferation of patents does not seem to pose a problem for software innovation itself. See 
BESSEN & MEURER, supra note 1, at 190 (“To date patents have had little negative effect 
within the software publishing industry because there are—despite the concerns of 
commentators—no substantial patent thickets within the industry.”); id. (“[A]lmost all 
software patents are obtained by firms outside the software industry.”).  
 104. My own conversations with people in the software business offer a cautionary note. 
Generally, they are quick to criticize patents, but then have a tendency to add qualifiers such as 
“unless it is obtained by a small firm.” It may be that some coherent norm exists here, but its 
contours are far from clear. 
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software patents, but that framework does not necessarily lead to 
that result. 
Another way to view the problem, however, is through the 
businesses that use (and write) their own software for specialized 
purposes. There are types of software (MS Word, Excel, TurboTax) 
that are designed for general use and would be properly classified as 
falling into the software market for purposes of a § 101 inquiry. Yet 
there are other programs that are designed for specific trades, such as 
banks, hotels, insurance, or lawyers. With respect to these business 
processes, one might wonder whether the norms of these particular 
trades should control. Drawing a distinction between general and 
specialized software makes sense because software is one of the few 
goods that can be developed for niche use by businesses outside the 
industry that uses them. By contrast, almost all tangible inventions 
such as machines are available for general use or are invented by 
R&D experts within a given trade. In either case, the patentability 
norms of the business that does the inventing would control because 
there is no other useful comparison. But for some business software, 
the spotlight could be placed either on firms who write programs or 
on end users who have in-house programmers doing the work and 
taking out the patents. 
Shifting the focus from the software industry as a whole to the 
communities such as telecommunications, computers, and 
electronics that do most of the software patenting may seem 
unimportant, but in one respect it could be a big help. After all, 
since these businesses are taking out patents on software, it would 
suggest that they share a norm supporting patentability. Another 
possibility, though, is these firms are against patents but must get 
them for defensive purposes and cannot escape this suboptimal 
equilibrium without some help in solving their collective action 
problem.105 Using an ordinary person test for subject-matter 
patentability offers a lifeline to these firms by giving significant 
weight to a policy statement by their professional associations about 
whether patents should be allowed. The same admonition would be 
meaningless under the current test since there is no effective means 
to discipline defectors. In essence, my proposal lowers the 
transaction costs involved in resolving this Prisoner’s Dilemma by 
 
 105. See Gideon Parchomovsky & R. Polk Wagner, Patent Portfolios, 154 U. PA. L. REV. 
1, 26–27 (2005) (“[T]he defensive patenting theory holds that firms acquire patents to ward 
off possible lawsuits by using the patents as bargaining chips with potential plaintiffs.”). 
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changing the necessary act from successfully lobbying Congress for a 
statutory exemption to an agreement in the industry on patent 
policy. Once again, it is difficult to say how much this change would 
reduce software patents, but it should at least make a dent in the 
problem.106 
Accordingly, modifying the § 101 analysis with an ordinary 
person qualification comes as close as can be reasonably expected to 
addressing the current problems with business method patents. To a 
large extent, this is a compromise proposal that would allow some of 
these patents to issue while blocking others that are not supported 
by the relevant parties. Perhaps it is not a good solution, but it is 
probably better than any competing alternative. 
III. CONCLUSION 
The ongoing debate about business method patents may mark 
the peak of an intellectual property bubble. For decades, Congress 
and the courts steadily expanded the scope of patent, copyright, and 
trademark protection based on a belief that additional creative 
incentives always lead to more innovation. Now the costs of that 
approach, as they do with all manias, are coming due in the form of 
patent trolls and endless litigation. 
As a result, what we need is a more pragmatic approach that pays 
heed to the expertise within a given industry before making the leap 
to patentability. Embracing long-established customs through an 
“ordinary person” test or secondary factor can accomplish this goal 
while avoiding the problems that are inherent in defining and 
evaluating business methods. Patent law can do many positive things, 
but producing better baseball is not one of them. Intellectual 
property must not be foisted on those who do not want or need it. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 106. Without further research, it is impossible to say how many industries that take out 
software patents do so for defensive reasons and would rather not. 
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